A fundamental distinction in Kantian philosophy is that between “appearance” and the “thing-in-itself.” Kant builds both his epistemology and his influential critique of metaphysics on this distinction. What is even more, traces of this distinction can be found also in the framework through which Kant develops his practical philosophy. This paper argues that with his conception of the “thing-in-itself” Kant firmly stands within – and even reinforces some aspect of – a certain philosophical tradition; a tradition that most likely begins with Parmenides and is exemplarily continued by Plato. This tradition is characterized by its disregard for, first, the notion of (shared) lifeworld practice and, second, the natural intuitions that arise from it (the so-called “common sense”). Further evidence to support this stance could be found in the semantic turn in philosophical discourse initiated by Frege. The analysis of our linguistic relation to the world and the intentions that make it comprehensible reveals the untenability of Kant’s thesis that the genuine objects of our knowledge are “appearances,” while “things-in-themselves” remain fundamentally inaccessible to us.

In Religion within the Limits of Reason Itself, Kant describes and criticizes two illusions of piety: the illusion of superstition and the illusion of selfdeception. According to him, both illusions hinder the pious life prescribed by historical religions, which in them is essentially impossible in its true form. Authentic religiosity for him coincides with authentic morality exercised by free will in the light of practical reason. One can also speak of illusoriness in religious experience from the perspective of Husserl’s phenomenology. There, illusoriness would arise if religious dogmatics and ritualism were to appear as religious experience. The founder of phenomenology claims that authentic religious experience is possible, and, moreover, possessing all the attributes required by the concept of “experience”. Apart from the distinction between apparent and intrinsic religiosity, both authors converge in accepting within the latter the thesis of ‘god-likeness’.

The dominant metaphysical orientation toward necessity – whether Aristotelian, Leibnizian, or formalized in modern modal logic – presuppose atemporality, closure, and non-contradiction. Necessity is conceived as a primordial modal status – what must be the case independently of temporal becoming, historical contingency, or subjective mediation. This paper challenges that assumption by advancing a temporal and non-totalizing conception of necessity, according to which necessity is not given in advance but is retroactively constituted through processes marked by contradiction. Drawing on Kant, Hegel, Lacan, and Badiou, the paper argues that necessity emerges after time – as the outcome of temporal articulation rather than its precondition. Kant’s schematism already discloses the dependence of necessity on temporal synthesis, even as it strives to preserve modal closure. Hegel radicalizes this insight by reconceiving necessity as the result of contradictory becoming, not its negation. Lacan introduces a non-totalizing logic in which necessity appears as a retroactive inscription within the symbolic order. Finally, Badiou reformulates necessity in terms of evental fidelity, where what “must have been” is established only through a contingent break within a situation. Across these trajectories, necessity is understood as a belated effect of temporal and subjective processes rather than a foundational modal given.

This article focuses on three “traps” that must be addressed in the conversation concerning the creation, justification, and implementation of policies aimed at managing the adverse consequences of climate change. The first trap is terminological, involving the frequent conflation within climate research of the concepts “environment” – which is material, sensory, and local – and “climate” – which is abstract, statistical, and global. The second trap is transactional, characterized by the subordination of moral actions to the requirements of utilitarian logic: ethically right is only that which produces a measurable effect on emissions. The third is the teleonomic trap, highlighting one of the most evident contradictions of the contemporary world: climate sustainability comes into conflict with the pursuit of development and prosperity, both at the individual and societal levels.

This study uses the archival heritage of Mini Maritsa Iztok (Maritsa East Mines) as a starting point for philosophical reflections on memory, identity, and social transformation in the context of today’s “green” policies. Through the archives – understood as carriers of lived experience, existential engagement, and cultural significance – we seek to explore those layers of Bulgaria’s industrial past that may underpin the transition from the “deep uncertainty” associated with “green” challenges towards possibilities for coping and inclusion in the sphere of the private, the everyday, and personal perspectives. In this sense, the archives are not merely a documentary foundation, but mediators of philosophical and social potentials through which the problematic place of industrial heritage in our present time can be meaningfully addressed.

This article examines social network advertising from a philosophical perspective, focusing on the ethical implications of passive data collection, interactivity, and hyper-personalization. The object of analysis is contemporary advertising practices embedded within social networking platforms, understood as socio-technical systems that mediate everyday communication, identity formation, and economic exchange. The study employs a qualitative, conceptual methodology grounded in philosophical analysis, drawing on normative ethics, philosophy of technology, and critical media theory to interpret existing empirical and theoretical research on digital advertising. The primary goal of the article is to assess whether hyper-personalized advertising practices undermine human autonomy and contribute to the commodification of the self. By analyzing the infrastructural conditions of data-driven advertising, the role of interactivity in shaping agency, and the normative status of personalization, the article moves from descriptive accounts of advertising mechanisms toward critical philosophical evaluation. It argues that social network advertising does not merely influence consumer behavior but increasingly participates in the construction of subjectivity itself, reshaping how individuals form preferences, exercise agency, and understand their own identities. In doing so, the article challenges traditional distinctions between persuasion and manipulation and situates social network advertising within broader debates on autonomy, power, and moral responsibility in digital environments.

The article presents the psychoanalytic oeuvre of Ivan Germanovich Kinkel (1883 – 1945) – the most significant figure in Bulgarian psychoanalysis during the 1920s – 1940s, who received personal recognition from Sigmund Freud. The key themes in his works are highlighted: the genesis and phenomenology of religion (animism, projection mechanisms, paternal and maternal complexes); the connection between psychoanalysis and sociology (complementing Marxism); the philosophy and methodology of psychoanalysis (materialistic monism, libido as foundation); the psychoanalysis of mysticism and occultism (regression and projection); revolutionary movements (social psychopathy, mania); as well as crime, prostitution, and suicide (biological and socio-economic roots). The aim is to systematize Kinkel’s major works and ideas, emphasizing his original synthesis of Freudianism, materialism, and interdisciplinarity, which anticipates contemporary approaches and regains relevance after 1989.