According to Kant, cognition (Erkenntnis) arises from the union of two basic faculties of the mind – sensibility and reason. This raises the question of whether these two faculties are independent of each other and, or, if they are dependent, which faculty is the determining one. Modern interpreters of Kant offer three types of solutions, in which, respectively, views perform independent cognitive functions, knowledge is the result of relatively free combination of concepts and intuitions, or of their connection in judgments under the dictate of the categories. This article offers a recapitulation of these three models of “synthesis”. Against this background, two specific problems are examined to which Kant did not pay sufficient attention. The first concerns cognition in children and animals, the second – perception. Modern achievements in cognitive science require a critical rethinking of the theories advocated by Kant.

The idea of projectity (projectness) is grounded as caring for the unity of creators, for the conciliarity of creative subjects. Some of the historical and philosophical roots of the projectual subject are examined: for example, in German idealist philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, Sartre’s existentialist ontology, and in the Bulgarian ontological tradition (Andonov, Dafov, Mitrentseva). The topic is directly linked to the historical and political context of the ideas of creativity and innovation.

The present paper explores the problem of the ontological status of the spirit from the perspective of the virtualistic metaphysics developed by Valentin Kanawrow. The main thesis is that the spirit cannot be adequately thought of as a substantial reality, but should be understood as a dynamic field of virtual possibilities that are actualized through symbolic and linguistic structures. In this context, metaphor is considered not simply as a rhetorical figure, but as an ontological mediator between the virtual and the actual. Through critical analysis, it is shown that virtualistic metaphysics offers a radical rethinking of ontology, transforming it into a theory of possibility and process.

The article\(^{1}\) defends the thesis that intelligent behavior might require not internal complexity but complex interaction. This is demonstrated by the various forms of stigmergy that can be observed both in social insects and in humans. The exposition is structured as follows: (§0) explains how the term “intelligence” is interpreted in the following text; (§1) clarifies the relation between intelligence and complexity; (§2) shows that intelligent behavior does not require internal complexity; (§3) introduces the concept of stigmergy; (§4) presents the mechanisms that give rise to this phenomenon; (§5) distinguishes several types of stigmergic interaction; (§6) briefly discusses the evolutionary mechanisms that could have produced them; (§7) sketches the possible ways in which the concept of stigmergy is used outside biology; (§8) examines collaborative stigmergy in humans; (§9) points to its epistemic projections; (§10) outlines some conclusions concerning the role of artificial intelligence systems and their place in human society.

The article explores the trend towards anthropologization of artificial intelligence. It analyzes this trend from the perspective of Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality, emphasizing the replacement of the real with the signs of the real and, consequently, the trivialization of the distinction between lie and truth, between real and imaginary. In such a context, various modes of AI anthropologisation are examined – specific concepts describing conditions of AI, images of models with their own biographies on social networks, virtual partners who evoke feelings in their creators and prompt them to certain actions. The study puts forward the hypothesis that the process of AI anthropologisation runs parallel to that of human machinization. Examples of similar machinization are given, focusing mainly on the weakening of some human cognitive abilities and the development of others based on the machine model, in which, however, algorithms perform far better. The question of the erosion of human relationships in this situation is raised, and consequently – of the beginnings of totalitarian thinking, of destructive and authoritarian behavior, which isolation and the feeling of insecurity provoke.

This article examines post-truth as a cultural regime of public sphere emerging at the intersection between the attention economy and platform logic. In this environment, emotionally charged narratives and social indicators of trust often replace expert verification. The argument is that artificial intelligence (AI) acts not simply as an accelerator of disinformation, but as a cultural technique that reorganizes the criteria for truth. On this basis, the concepts of “algorithmic public sphere” (fragmented, affectively structured publics), “synthetic authenticity” (the aesthetics of verisimilitude in deepfakes and generative models), and the transformation of “regimes of truth” (Foucault) into model-predictive standards. The conclusion emphasizes the need for media and algorithmic literacy, as well as research tools for the ethical and epistemic management of synthetic realities.

This review examines an edited volume released in 2025 by the prestigious international publishing house Cambridge Scholars. The papers herein stem from presentations given at two international conferences on process philosophy. The collection features 15 contributions by researchers from Bulgaria, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Ukraine, and Slovakia. These are structured into four parts covering fundamental educational concepts, the future of education, aesthetic and ethical inquiries, and medical and psychological issues.