

KANT'S SYSTEM OF JUDGMENTS

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Abstract. In the Transcendental Analytic of *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant realizes a remarkable achievement – he derives the system of logical functions of judgment. This is namely the “legal claim”, which Kant’s investigation of the judgment has to prove in front of the court of reason. For this purpose, we will undertake a reconstruction of the course of proofs on which Kant generates this system. We will start with its initial grounding – by introducing the pure concepts, which divide “the entire field of the understanding”. From here, we have to reveal the connection between the pure concepts of the understanding and the judgments in thinking. In this consideration, Kant acquires a new definition of judgment and a new establishing of its constitution. Finally, a solid proof must be presented for the logical principle and the completeness of the system of logical functions of judgment in thinking.

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If we bring the judgment to the court of reason, we inevitably have to announce its “legal claim” (Kant, 1998: 220). In the circle of problems and solutions of Kant’s investigation of judgment, this claim concerns the highest scope of the problem for the essence and structure of judgment. Let us announce this claim in its actual scope and achievement. As a result of considering the judgment in the Transcendental Analytic of *Critic of Pure Reason*, Kant deduces the system of its pure and original logical functions. This is a remarkable and important result. If we announce the latter, this achievement should have its solid evidential grounding. This is the task of the present article: to follow the course of proofs for deducing the system of judgmental functions in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

For this purpose, we will undertake the reconstruction of Kant’s argumentation through the Transcendental Analytic as an evidential *topic* of the system of judgment. The general construction lies on the following presuppositions. Kant clearly postulates that the understanding is a “system”. From here, the sum total of the pure concepts of the understanding is also a system, then the Table of judgments likewise should be a system. These presuppositions entirely ground the new look at the definition and structure of judgment. This general reconstruction of the proofs and innovations of Transcendental Analytic offers new solutions to the main problems in the logical theory of judgment.

I. The field of the understanding

In his initial move, Kant determines the understanding as a transcendental *faculty for thinking*. Kant establishes the Transcendental Analytic on the investigating of “the entire field of pure understanding” (Kant, 1998: 201), at the end of the Transcendental Analytic of Principles Kant announces the whole covering and measuring of the “land of pure understanding” (Kant, 1998: 201). The understanding is demonstrated as a “whole” of the a priori cognition, which it consists and in which it participates, as a “unity that subsists on its own” (Kant, 1998: 201). This is a key grounding – the understanding can be fully covered and all that it consists can be defined and measured. According to Kant, this proves the understanding as a “system”, not as “an aggregate” (Kant, 1998: 201). Here Kant introduces a main argument and ground for defining of thinking and the “faculties for thinking”, namely, they are systematic. Therefore, they are available to be fully investigated and deduced.

But how exactly “the completeness and articulation” (Kant, 1998: 201) of the system, which the understanding consists, must be derived. Kant undertakes an important move: there must be basic elements to which the entire field and a priori cognition of the understanding are going to be reduced, and these elements should be sought and extracted. The entire field of the understanding must be parceled out. In the same way, the whole a priori cognition of the understanding must be reduced to its basic structural units.

According to Kant, the solution to this problem is to divide (Kant, 1998: 201) the field of the understanding as a transcendental faculty for thinking to the basic elements of thinking – the concepts (Kant, 1998: 193). These concepts connect with each other and define each other to the whole of the understanding. So they summarize and articulate the entire cognition of the understanding.

From the solution how to articulate the whole of the understanding, a new problem follows – what are these concepts and how exactly they relate to the understanding. What is their role in its activity as a fundamental faculty for thinking?

II. The *ancestral registry* of the understanding

This is the exact task in front of the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts – to deduce “the ancestral registry of the understanding” (Kant, 1998: 213). This registry actually consists of the concepts of the understanding. Then, what are their basic characteristics?

First, they originate from the division of pure understanding (I.). Therefore, they are “pure and unmixed” (Kant, 1998: 204) a priori concepts.

The understanding entirely decomposes itself to them, so these concepts are its initial components (Kant, 1998: 203). From here, they are “elementary” (Kant, 1998: 201), simple elements, on which the work of the understanding in thinking and cognition is grounded.

Finally, they are “original pure concepts of synthesis” (Kant, 1998: 213). With this, Kant demonstrates them as pure and basic elements of thinking. He defines the thinking as an activity that constructs the general representations. These general representations are formed through the unification of a certain multitude of other representations, which

can be empirical or common. Here Kant gives a definition of a great importance. It is the definition of a *function* as the way how concepts work in thinking: “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one” (Kant, 1998: 205).

Then, namely, the pure concepts of the understanding have to give the very basis for constructing the general representation and the necessary unity of representations, which is the basis of thinking as such. Thus, the pure concepts of the understanding are demonstrated as the basic elements of the activity of the understanding. That is why Kant defines them as the result of “**analysis of the faculty of the understanding itself**” (Kant, 1998: 202). As pure concepts of synthesis, they should be then in the basis of its use in thinking and cognition.

Now we can comprehend what was achieved until this point: the pure concepts of the understanding constitute its activity as a faculty for thinking. They give its ancestral registry. We can raise the question – what is their mutual connection? The answer will bring us to the revelation of their concrete deriving and order.

III. System of the pure concepts of the understanding

The pure concepts of the understanding form a system and establish the understanding as a faculty for thinking (I. – II.). Kant seeks the “clue” for their “discovery” (Kant, 1998: 206). If they form a system, they must have an “order and systematic unity” (Kant, 1998: 204). This leads to the necessity of the fundamental connection between all of them to be deduced, there must be “a principle” (Kant, 1998: 204) in their origin and order. If we will be able to formulate this principle, we will also be able, according to Kant, to determine the connection between all of the pure concepts of the understanding together and from there “a rule by means of which the place of each pure concept and the completeness of all of them together can be determine a priori” (Kant, 1998: 204). Each pure concept of the understanding will have its own place and determination in their common system. The system must be basic and complete, which Kant categorically declares (Kant, 1998: 214). This cannot be made the other way around, because the system encompasses the entire field of the understanding.

But how the rule of the system of these pure concepts could be determined and from here on the connection of each of them to the others to be discovered. With this, the specific and the content of each one of them can be unfold. The answer to this question points to the specific relation between the pure concepts and the understanding as such. What is the specific use of the pure concepts of the understanding? Which are their specific functions? If the basic activity of the understanding is in thinking, then the functions and use of the pure concepts of the understanding have to be *logical*. Here we go deeper into the core of Kant’s investigation of the judgment.

IV. The logical use of the pure concepts of the understanding

The pure concepts of the understanding do the real activity of the understanding, they are in the basis of its use as a faculty for thinking. Kant underlines their logical use: “Now

the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them" (Kant, 1998: 205). With this, the logical function of the understanding is specified: to judge on the objects, to make *judgments* for them. The pure concepts of the understanding lie in the basis of this activity of the understanding. Then here, we are forced to do a very important conclusion: such pure concept participates in every judging of the understanding. Namely, this concept makes the judging possible. It gives the basic act of synthesis in the judging on the object.

Here is the place to apply Kant's definition of judgment: "Judgment is, therefore, the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it" (Kant, 1998: 205). Every judgment is an act of unification, of synthesis of a multitude of representations. The common act of their unity is provided by a pure concept of the understanding. Then another conclusion follows: there is a pure concept of the understanding in every judgment. This concept gives "the unity" of many representations drawn by the act of the judgment. The pure concepts of the understanding participate in the structure of judgment and they are elements of this structure.

Kant clearly defines the logical function of the pure concepts of the understanding in the judgment. They provide "functions of unity among our representations", "many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one" (Kant, 1998: 205). Kant offers innovative solutions to the realization and structure of the judgment. A judgment is taken as a logical act of synthesis, which realizes the activity of the understanding in thinking. Kant projects the form of judgment on the specifics of the understanding as a faculty for thinking.

Here we have a common view on the full connection between the understanding, its pure concepts, and the judgment in thinking. Kant postulates the specifics of logical activity of the understanding in thinking: "We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments" (Kant, 1998: 205). Every fundamental action of the understanding represents a basic kind of judgment or an act of judging. And this act of judging is ruled by one pure concept of the understanding. The complete logical function and purpose of the pure concepts of the understanding are realized in the pure logical activity of the understanding in the judgments. It turns out that the concrete pure concepts of the understanding can be derived from the basic kinds of judgments: "The functions of the understanding can, therefore, all be found together if one can exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgments" (Kant, 1998: 206). This is already the real *clue* for deriving of the pure concepts of the understanding and it is given with the systematical deducing of judgment in its basic functions in thinking. All this means that the judgment has to be considered in its originating and use in the whole a priori cognition of the understanding.

We can now make a major *conclusion*:

The system of the pure concepts of the understanding requires the system of pure judgmental functions of the understanding, which leads to the system of basic kinds of judgment in thinking.

Following this, we come to the problem of the pure logical form of judgment. The element of a pure concept of the understanding is added to this form. We can go further with the formulation that the logical form of judgment is founded on the function of unity provided by a pure concept of the understanding. In regard to the pure form of a judgment, this function “gives unity to different representations” (Kant, 1998: 211), in regards to the logical content of a judgment, it gives “**in an intuition**” “transcendental content” (Kant, 1998: 211).

Let us summarize the consequences from IV.

1. Kant gains a new logical definition of judgment, based on the specific logical activity of the understanding as a faculty for thinking.

2. The logical activity of the pure concepts of the understanding is demonstrated as an element of the constitution of the judgment: as a formal unity in judgment and as a unity of its transcendental-logical content.

3. The pure concepts of the understanding can be derived from the systematical deducing of the actions of unity in judgments, this leads to the system of pure logical functions in judgment.

So, we come closer to the main questions – what are the basic logical functions of unity in judgments and how they determine the basic kinds of its form in thinking.

V. The system of logical functions in judgment

Here, we have to solve on what foundation the system of the function of unity in judgment has to be grounded. This foundation should embrace the entire potential of the judgment and, even more, should reveal the initial and simple components in its constitution. Kant achieves here a real depth in the analysis of the judgment as a fundamental action of the understanding. The foundation of the system of judgmental functions must be ground on “the mere form of the understanding” in the judgment (Kant, 1998: 206). The question of the pure logical form of judgment, and of its basic components is here clearly posited. Namely, this is the foundation on which Kant is going to form the system of judgmental functions, in order to deduce upon it the system of concrete pure concepts of the understanding.

Then, we have the following solution: “the function of thinking” in judgment (Kant, 1998: 206) is based on the pure elements of the form of judgment.

It is remarkable how Kant is reaching this point of his investigation and gives a new projection on the constitutive pure elements of judgment. These elements must incarnate the whole potential of judgment as a form of thinking. They are projected on the entire field of the understanding. Thus, they give a new kind of division of this region. The division is of a higher rank – to the pure function of thinking as the main partitions of the understanding and to its own specific activity on that level.

This is already an essential foundation of the “four titles” (Kant, 1998: 206), the main aspects of the function of thinking in judgments. They could be considered as general functions of thinking, which determine the possibilities of the logical form of judgment.

Kant gives their signification and order: *quantity*, *quality*, *relation* and *modality*. This should be the systematical foundation of “the moments of thinking in general” (Kant, 1998: 207) in judgment.

If we derive the essential logical characteristic of each general function from the way how Kant considers them, we will discover their foundation on the specifics of the logical form of judgment. The quality is a function on “the concept of the subject”, in regards to its “domain” (Kant, 1998: 207) or extension. The quality is a general judgmental function on the extension of the *subject* of the judgment.

The quantity is a function of unity on the “predicate”, “whether it is attributed to the subject or opposed to it” (Kant, 1998: 207). The quantity is a general function on the *predicate* of the judgment.

The relation is a function of unity between the representations drawn into the judgment: “All relations of thinking in judgments” are between “two concepts”, between “two judgments”, and between “several judgments” (Kant, 1998: 208). The relation is a general function on the *logical relation* in the judgment.

The modality is a function of unity between the judgment and the region of thinking: the modality “concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general” (Kant, 1998: 209). The modality is a general function of the judgment in regards to the *thinking in general*.

Let us now clearly stand out the foundation and the scope of Kant’s Table of judgments. Each general function of thinking, which is going to determine basic kinds of judgment, is stated on the basic element from the structure of the judgment. These are also the elements, which constitute the extensional and intentional potential of judgment in thinking, they develop its potential from its initial constituting to its most complex scope and intensity in thinking.

There occurs a fundamental consequence from I. – V.: Kant projects new constitutive elements in the judgment, along with the traditionally accepted subject, predicate and copula. This gives the opportunity for a new interpretation of judgment and its constitution for completing the task its formations in thinking to be fully derived. Namely, this is the foundation and the general argument for constructing the complete “systematic topic” (Kant, 1998: 214) of the judgment.

It is necessary to provide one more, ultimate proof for accomplishing the deducing of exactly these general functions of thinking in the judgment.

VI. The logical principle of the system of judgment

Kant underlines the fundamentality of the Table of judgments: “This division is systematically generated from a common principle, namely the faculty for judging (which is the same as the faculty for thinking)” (Kant, 1998: 213). The principle of the division has its clear logical grounds for the fundamentality and completeness of generated system. This is the categorical proof, given by Kant, for the deducing of the system of judgmental functions: “for besides quality, quantity, and relation there is nothing more that constitutes

the content of a judgment” (Kant, 1998: 209). The general functions of quality, quantity, and relation, work for all cognitions that are drawn and processed into a judgment. What is left is the general function to form the logical whole of the judgment, namely, the modality must provide this last judgmental function. Kant projects it toward the entire scope of the judgment when the judgment has to be related to the thinking in general. The judgment has to be formed in regards to the thinking in general, and in this way to be “bound to the understanding according to its laws” (Kant, 1998: 210). The general function of modality is the most complex one from all the judgmental functions, it completes the scope and intensity of the judgment.

As a result of the course of proofs from I. – VI., the judgment is developed in the system of its pure logical functions as “logical functions of all possible judgments” (Kant, 1998: 212). Kant builds up the system of judgment in its complete registry and possibilities. With this, the task in front of the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts is accomplished: to find the “clue” for deducing of all pure concepts of the understanding. Through the system of logical functions in judgment the foundation of the systematic topic of pure understanding is set, “for the understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity is entirely measured by these functions” (Kant, 1998: 212). This is also a result of developing the systematical possibilities of the thinking in general.

In the Transcendental Analytic of *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant realizes a remarkable achievement – he deduces the system of logical functions of judgment and demonstrates its fundamentality and registry. In regards to this result, the entire unfolding of this system should be reconsidered. This gives the foundation for a rethinking of the constitution and potential of judgment to its entire possibilities as a form of thinking. Kant succeeds in one of the most important tasks in front of logic and philosophy: to generate the systematic topic of thinking. The demonstrated system of judgment challenges the logicians to work for the systematization of the other basic formations in thinking, in order we could gain “the legal claim” for possession not only on “the land of the understanding”, but on the territory of thinking in general.

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